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A CAMERA IN THE COURTROOM
M.

RAY DOUBLES*

"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of... the
press; ... ,1

The Supreme Court of the United States has long since ruled that
this guarantee likewise is implicit in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, and that the states are enjoined from action
2
which would unduly violate freedom of the press.

Wholly apart from the federal Constitution, the states provide
similar guarantees. Thus the Virginia Bill of Rights provides: "That
the Freedom of the Press is one of the great Bulwarks of Liberty, and
can never be restrained but by despotic Governments." 3
In our democratic form of government there are many forums,
most of which are always public. Among these are our courtrooms
where the public can see how justice is administered and whether it
is administered fairly and impartially by the judge and other public
4
officials. It is said in Craig v. Harney:
"A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room
is public property.... Those who see and hear what transpired
can report it with impunity. There is no special perquisite
of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor
events which transpire in proceedings before it."
The foregoing concepts have given rise in the last several decades
to an insistent request, a demand in some quarters, that newsmen be
*Judge, Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, Part II. B.S. 1922,
Davidson College; LL.B. 1926, University of Richmond; J.S.D. 1929, University of
Chicago.
'U.S. Const. amend. i.
-Cant-well v. Connecticut, 3io U.S. 296 (1940).
3Va. Const., Bill of Rights § 12.
'33
U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
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permitted to photograph the proceedings in the courtroom, and that
televising of such proceedings be permitted. This gives rise, therefore,
to the question: To what extent, if at all, may courtroom proceedings
be -the subject of the camera, including the televising of trials?
In view of the holdings that "expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments," 5 and that "the Filst Amendment
draws no distinction between the various methods of communicating
ideas," 6 there remains no doubt that the protection of freedom of
speech and the press is extended to the medium of television, therefore,
much, if not all, of what is said in the decisions about caineras and
motion pictures would appear to be equally applicable to television.
As a result of the resentment properly felt over the circus-like atmosphere which surrounded the trial of Bruno Hauptmann for the
kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby, with the spectacle of photographers leaping about like acrobats, while flash bulbs exploded,
Kleig lights glared, and witnesses tripped over electric wires and broadcasting equipment, the American Bar Association, on September 3o,
19 3 7, adopted Canon 35 of the Canon of Professional and Judicial
Ethics. The Canon, with amendments indicated, is as follows:
"The taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions
of the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting
[or televising] 7 of courtroom proceedings, [are calculated to]s
detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract
the witness in giving his testimony, [degrade the court] 9 and
create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the
public and should not be permitted."
It is a matter of open controversy whether the Canon can be justified
today, or if it can, whether the reasons stated in the Canon are accurate.
I. DIGNITY OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
One of the reasons given in the Canon is -that "broadcasting or
televising of courtroom proceedings detract from the essential dignity
of the proceedings."
A decade or more ago there were many valid practical objections
to the televising of courtroom proceedings. These might be called
'Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).

OSuperior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954).
7

Added in 1952.

"Deleted in 1963.
'Deleted in 1963.
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physical objections, such as the noise associated with the clicking of
cameras, intensive floodlights, commotion associated with the moving
of apparatus, etc. These are no longer valid objections. Remarkable
technological advancements have been made in the audio-visual media.
Cameras are no longer unwieldly and they are practically noiseless.
High-speed lens enable the making of excellent shots under ordinary
lighting conditions. Telescopic lens enable the making of closeup pictures from a distance. Microphones are so small and sensitive that they
may be completely hidden. The whole apparatus can be enclosed
in a booth, outside the walls of the courtroom, with only the nose of
the camera projecting through a small hole in the wall.
In Lyles v. State,'0 the defendant, who had been convicted of burglary, sought to have his conviction reversed on the ground that the
trial court had permitted the use of television cameras in the courtroom. No actual prejudice to the defendant was shown, but he relied
heavily upon a violation of Canon 35. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the conviction, and in doing so discussed the matter at
length, saying in part:
"But, where court proceedings may be taken for reproduction
on sound track and film without disruption or in a manner not
degrading to the court, and without infringement upon any
fundamental right of the accused, why should not such agences, within the reasonable rules prescribed by the courts, be
permitted to do so?
"....

On numerous occasions, supervised televising in this Court

has been conducted. Our experience is that when properly
supervised by the court, there is neither disturbance, distraction,
nor lack of dignity or decorum."' "
Of more than passing significance is the situation existing in
Colorado. In December 1955, the Supreme Court of that state designated one of its justices as a referee to hold hearings on Canon 35Six days were devoted to the hearings; many witnesses were heard;
hundreds of exhibits were introduced; cameras were demonstrated
and were used without the referee or spectators being aware of their
operation. As a result of a favorable report by the referee, Justice 0.
Otto Moore,' 2 the following was adopted as Canon 35 for the State
of Colorado:
"o330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. 1958).
n3o P.2d at 741-42.
'1 n re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics, 296 P.2d
465, 472 (1956).
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"Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting
dignity and decorum.
"Until further order of this Court, if a trial judge in any
court shall believe from the particular circumstances of a given
case, or any portion thereof, that the taking of photographs
in the courtroom, or the broadcasting by radio or television of
court proceedings would detract from the dignity thereof, distract the witness in giving his testimony, degrade the court,
or otherwise materially interfere with the achievement of a
fair ,trial, it should not be permitted; provided, however, that
no witness or juror in attendance under subpoena or order of
court shall be photographed or have his testimony broadcast
over his expressed objection; and provided further that under
no circumstances shall any court proceeding be photographed
or broadcast by any person without first having obtained permission from the trial judge to do so, and then only under such
regulations as shall be prescribed by him."
Thus, in Colorado, the whole matter is left to the trial judge as to
whether courtroom proceedings shall be televised. This is also true in
Texas, and possibly a few other states.
In so far as it may be claimed that televising courtroom proceedings would interfere physically with the dignity of the court, it would
appear that any such claim cannot be supported today.
As a matter of fact it is not the dignity of courtroom proceedings
that is involved. The duty of the judge is not so much to maintain
dignity as it is to maintain decorum and orderly procedure in order
that the truth may be established. Some of the means used to establish
the truth may be quite undignified.
In certain cases witnesses are compelled to use vulgar and obscene
language in describing scenes witnessed or conversations overheard.
On occasion it is necessary to permit the lawyer to become quite
undignified in his questioning of a witness who apparently is attempting to evade a truthful answer upon cross-examination. The test
in such a situation is not the dignity of the lawyer but whether he is
debasing, degrading or intimidating the witness.
Some lawyers have a tendency to yell at the top of their voices
during certain phases of their closing arguments to the jury, if they
think that maneuver effective. It may be undignified, but they are
entitled to do it.
So, it is not dignity that we seek to maintain in the courtroom,
but decorum and orderly procedure; an atmosphere free from dis,tractions with only one thing going on at a time before the court and
jury.
In this connection it must be observed that there is always a danger
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that some prosecuting attorneys and judges, particularly in those
states in which the judges are elected by popular vote of the people,
will think of themselves as actors and play to the galleries. But if the
television camera otherwise has a right to be in the courtroom, it ought
not be denied just because a few officials make fools out of themselves
before a larger audience than otherwise would be -the case.
An equally serious danger is that some lawyers, prone to latch
onto any proper media for advertising their professional capabilities,
would make a play for more clients by carefully staged performances.
It is regrettable that we are faced on occasion with the courtroom
histrionics of a few lawyers and judges that are primarily designed
to entertain and amuse, or are calculated to advance their personal
ambitions. But as someone has said, it is not good housekeeping to
sweep one's trash under the carpet, or pull down the blinds so that
it cannot be seen from the outside.
II.

THE LEGAL CONTENTIONS INVOLVED

The two main legal contentions made by the news media in support of their movement for permission to televise courtroom proceedings are: (A) Right of Public Trial, and (B) Freedom of the Press.
A. Right of Public Trial
One of the leading cases representing the concept of the public
trial is that of In re Oliver13 which involved the Michigan judgegrand jury. It is provided by the statute of that state that the judge
may sit as a one-man grand jury and may punish anyone for contempt
who fails to answer questions. A judge did this in the above case, in
the secrecy of his chambers. The Supreme Court of the United States,
in reversing the contempt citation, said:
"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public
trial 'to an accused has its roots in our English common-law
heritage....
"The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials
has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice
by the Spanish Inquisition, the excesses of the English Court of
Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre
de cachet [by which Louis XV is said to have prosecuted 15o,ooo
crimes of opinion].... The knowledge that every criminal
trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of
u-S. 257 (1947).
U333
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public opinion 14is an effective restraint on possible abuse of
judicial power."
Using this traditional concept that the defendant in a criminal
trial or contempt citation is entitled to a public trial, the opponents
of Canon 35 graft thereon a correlative right of the public also.
An extreme illustration of this viewpoint is found in the case of
E. E. Scripps Co. v. Fulton,15 in which a newspaper procured a writ
of prohibition against a judge to prevent him from excluding the public, including the newspaper, from a trial against a defendant charged
with pandering. The defendant had moved the court to exclude the
public on the ground that he could better compel the witnesses for
the state to tell the truth if the public were excluded. The court said:
"The community is deeply interested in the right to observe
the administration of justice and the presence of its members
at a public trial is as basic as that of a defendant whether such
right be provided for in the constitution or otherwise."' 0
The majority view is to the contrary, and is represented by the
case of United Press Ass'ns. v. Valente,17 in which a photographer
sought to enjoin a judge from enforcing an order excluding the public from the courtroom. The injunction was denied, the court saying:
"It is for the defendant alone to determine whether, and to
what extent, he shall avail himself of [the right to a public
trial]. To permit outsiders to interfere with the defendant's
own conduct of his defense would not only upset the orderly
workings of the judicial process, but could well redound to the
defendant's exceeding prejudice.
"The public's interest is adequately safeguarded as long as
the accused himself is given the opportunity to assert on his own
behalf, in an available judicial forum, his right to a trial that
is fair and public."' 8
But still another reason advanced by opponents of Canon 85 is
illustrated by what was said in Lyles v. State, in which the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma refused to reverse the conviction of a defendant
for murder just because the courtroom proceedings had been televised:
"It has been said without education the people perish. There
is no field of government about which the people know so little as they do about the courts. Those institutions of justice
"333 U.S. at 266, 268-70.
25 1oo Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d

896 (1955).
"x25 N.E.2d at 899.
'73o8 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
1123 N.E.2d at 780-81.
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engaged in construing constitutional rights and interpreting
legislative acts which will determine our enjoyment of life
and liberty and our pursuit of happiness. What is more vital
to the people?
....All too long the public concept of courtroom proceedings
and demeanor has been the antiquated or distorted motion picture portrayals. It is19 time the people were shown the truth
about their courts."'
It is undoubtedly true that if more people could be permitted to
observe actual and properly conducted judicial proceedings, the public
would receive fewer misconceptions from, and would be less inclined
to be misled and amused by, the objectionable histrionics and the distorted portrayals that occur in some of the simulated courtroom proceedings produced by the motion picture and television industry.
But the ready answer to that is for the industry to put its own house
in order by refusing to show scenes in which courtroom proceedings
are distorted, and to demand of scenario writers that such scenes be
accurately portrayed.
Proponents of Canon 35, viewing the demand of the news media
to televise courtroom proceedings as a mere attempt to provide entertainment for the viewing public, cite such cases as In re Mack,20 in
which some newspaper photographers had secretly violated a rule of
court against taking pictures in a courthouse corridor of a defendant
convicted of first degree murder. They were convicted of contempt, and
Justice Arnold, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, said: "Court rooms and court houses are not places of
entertainment, and trials are not had for the purpose of satisfying
any sadistic instinct of the public seeking sensationalism."'2' His remarks drew caustic criticism from a minority of the court, who, speaking through Justice Musmanno, said:
"If this type of reasoning is to prevail, why not then shut
out the public from all courthouses? ...This censure on the
part of the Majority is in the nature of an indictment of the
whole American public because interest in famous and important trials is as intense as the desire to follow the fortunes
of baseball, football and basketball teams.
"The argument of the Majority against public participation in the viewing of court proceedings is the same argument
which in ancient days sought to defend star chamber proceedings.... indeed, why not turn back the clock of civilization
"33o P.2d at 742-43.
'DS86 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956).
2126 A.2d at 682.
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and... let no records be kept, photographic or otherwise. By
that process the public will never have an opportunity to satisfy their instincts-not for sensationalism, but22for information
as to what their supposed servants are doing."
In all fairness and candor, however, it must be observed that the
words of the majority in In re Mack were not directed at newspaper
reporting, but at photography, and it is confidently felt in many quarters that the motive of those desiring to televise courtroom proceedings is prompted, not from a desire to educate the public, but by an
eagerness to provide sensational news coverage and entertainment
within the broad meaning of that phrase. The language of the majority was not aimed at exclusion of all news media nor of the public
from the courtroom, but merely exclusion of the camera.
However, adherents to Canon 35 get little comfort on this sensational entertainmentversus education issue from the expressions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in those cases in which attempts
have been made to bar salacious materials from the newsstands. For
example, the Court said in Winters v. New York:23 "The line between
the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection
of that basic right [freedom of the press]. Everyone is familiar with
instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement, -teaches another's doctrine."
It is said that the Canon discriminates in favor of the press against
radio and television, in that the newsman is permitted, but not the
camera nor the broadcaster. A suggested answer is that reporters of all
media are permitted to be present, and that the newspaper presses
are not permitted. Reporters are permitted to be present, but their
stories are prepared elsewhere and so is the printing.
But the telecaster replies to this by saying that this is no answer
to the right of the public to know exactly what is going on: that a
news reporter conveys his observations influenced by his own conclusions; that as opposed to this necessarily inexact information, the
television industry offers an opportunity to bypass the biases, opinions and selectivity of the middleman newspaper reporter by permitting the viewer to obtain an exact picture of the proceedings, whereby,
having seen for himself he can draw his own conclusions.
On its face this appears -to be a forceful argument, but it it not accurate. It is apparent that a trial is not going to be televised in its
entirety. This is necessarily true because the time limitation on pro2126 A.2d at 692.
"333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
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gramming would make it impractical for a station to devote its entire
time to the telecast of a lengthy trial. Furthermore, news by its very
nature, is partial and incomplete.
What then is the nature of this so-called public right? Is it the
right of the public to see and hear the witnesses? Is it the right to be
entertained or even educated by what is said and done in the courtroom? No.
It is the right of the public to know that its public servants in
charge of the trial, the judge and court attendants, are discharging
their duties in a fair and trustworthy manner; that witnesses are given
fair opportunity to testify fully without illegal interference, restraint
or intimidation; that laws are being equally enforced; and the right
to have the press comment and criticize what goes on.
It is true that our courts must be so conducted that the public
will be convinced that justice is being properly administered; and
undoubtedly this knowledge would often be conveyed more accurately and to more people by televising court proceedings than by any
other media of news dissemination. But this argument proceeds solely
upon the degree of public participation afforded.
The constitutional guarantee that trial be public means nothing
more than it shall not be private. It does not mean that it has to be
transferred to the town hall or Madison Square Garden because the
courtroom is too small to accommodate all those who would like to
attend. Similarly it does not mean that it must be televised for the
benefit of those whose duties prevent them from personal attendance,
or for those who are too lazy to attend in person.
A trial is not held for public information or education. It is held
for the solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth in a controversy between the parties and to adjust their rights accordingly, and
that is the sole purpose.
So long as the public, including those of the news gathering media,
are permitted to be present in the courtroom, there is no danger to
a reversion to Star Chamber proceedings nor of an arbitrary and
despotic judiciary, and this is the sole danger to be guarded against
by public trial.
B. Freedom of the Press
In approaching the issue presented by this concept, it must be
borne in mind that most of the law on -this topic has arisen out of
cases in which contempt proceedings have been instituted against
publishers who have published articles highly critical of the conduct
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or legal rulings of a judge. In a few, the contempt citation has been
for violation of an order of court prohibiting the taking of pictures
inside the courthouse but outside the courtroom proper. We will take
occasion later to see whether a distinction should be made between
this situation and a contemporaneous televising of what actually
transpires in the courtroom while a trial is in progress.
It is generally said that the main purpose of the first amendment
guarantee of a free press (and of freedom of speech) is "to prevent
previous restraint upon (as had been imposed by other governments
and in early times in this country), or the stifling of efforts pointing
toward, enlightenment of individuals upon or concerning their right
and beliefs and the duties of their rulers." 24 In determining the extent
to which restraints may legitimately be levied upon the press, the
courts have applied the so-called clear and present danger test. It
should be pointed out, however, that protection from previous restraint of publication, does not privilege the publication, nor does it
protect the publisher from subsequent actions for libel, nor from contempt, if the article exceeds the legal bounds.
Probably the leading cases out of which the clear and present
danger test has been evolved, are Bridges v. California,25 Pennekamp
v. Florida,26 and Craig v. Harney.27 The test may be stated as follows:
There must be a clear and present danger that the publication will result in some substantial interference with the proper
administration of justice.
The mere liklihood, however great, that a substantial evil
will result, cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of
speech or of the press. The substantial evil to the administration
of justice must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high in order to constitute a clear and
present danger before utterances of a newspaper can be held
to be contempt of court and before freedom of the press can be
restrained.
In this connection it should be made clear that the rule is not applied as a safeguard for judges as persons, but for the function they
exercise, i.e., the administration of justice. As an interesting sidelight,
consider one of these cases, Craig v. Harney. A jury, in a civil case
involving a dispute between landlord and tenant, three times refused
to bring in a verdict for one of the parties as they had been directed
"In

re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 168 P.2d 706, 713 (1946).

2'314 U.S. 252 (1941).
331 (1946).
'0328

U.S.
2'331 U.S. 367 (1947).

1965]

CAMERA IN

COURTROOM

11

to do by the trial judge. Finally they complied with the judge's direction, stating however, that they acted under coercion of the court
and against their own conscience. A newspaper severely criticized the
actions of the judge, an elected layman, as "arbitrary action," "a travesty on justice," "high-handed action," and many other similar epithets. In reversing a contempt conviction, the majority of the Supreme
Court said: "But the law of contempt is not made for the protection
of judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges
are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate. '28 Justice Jackson, in a dissent, said in response: "But even
worse is that this Court appears to sponsor the myth that judges are
not as other men are, and that therefore newspaper attacks on them
are negligible because they do not penetrate the judicial armor ....
I do not know whether it is the view of this Court that a judge must
be thickskinned or just thickheaded, but nothing in my experience
or observation confirms the idea that he is insensitive to publicity." 29
Returning to the main issue, freedom of the press is not an absolute
freedom. Indeed no freedom is absolute. When freedom of the press
conflicts with other equally important interests, a partial abridgement
of freedom of the press may be required. As was said by Justice Frankfurter, concurring, in Pennekamp v. Florida:
"Without a free press there can be no free society. Freedom
of the press, however, is not an end in itself but a means to the
end of a free society.... The independence of the judiciary is
no less a means to the end of a free society, and the proper
functioning of an independent judiciary puts the freedom of
the press in its proper perspective.
"..... A free press is vital to a democratic society because its

freedom gives it power. Power in a democracy implies re30
sponsibility in its exercise."
Every situation involving a clash between equally important freedoms must be evaluated upon a consideration of the facts of the given
case. In the present inquiry we are weighing two important fundamentals to a free society against each other. In doing so we must
guard against two possible dangers; (i) on the one hand, the abridgement of the constitutional guarantee of a free press under the guise of
preserving dignity and decorum in the courtroom. (2) on the other
hand, permitting individuals to interfere with the orderly administration of justice under the cloak of the guarantee.
'Od. at 376.
2Id. at 396.
10328 US. at 354-55.
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As might be expected under the clear and present danger test, the
set of facts must be strong before a person, acting under a claim of
freedom of the press, may be convicted of contempt of court, either on
account of published criticism of a judge or for violation of a court
order respecting activities outside the courtroom proper. Should the
same test be applied to a demand that live telecasting be permitted
of the courtroom proceedings itself? If so, it is clear the proponents
of Canon 35 carry the burden of proving a strong case that any such
televising constitutes a real danger to the administration of justice.
As already seen in the case of Lyles v. State, the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma refused to apply the Canon where no actual prejudice
was shown to have resulted from televising of certain scenes inside
the courtroom during a murder trial.
On the other hand in State v. Clifford,31 the court upheld a contempt conviction of a photographer who violated an order of court
prohibiting the taking of pictures of a defendant charged with embezzlement. The court said:
"A judge is at all times during the sessions of the court empowered to maintain decorum and enforce reasonable rules to
insure the orderly and judicious disposition of the court's business.
"....

When the court is in session it is under the complete con-

trol of the judge whose directions, reasonably necessary to maintain order and preserve
unnecessary disturbances and distrac32
tion, must be obeyed."
In preserving such right, the court does not interfere with the freedom
of the press.
It is apparent that a weaker set of facts will satisfy a test which
prohibits action that creates unnecessary disturbances and distraction
than are necessary to create a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. Is there something, then, about the courtroom
itself and the proceedings in progress therein, which differentiates
them from other aspects of the judicial process of administering
justice?
A court trial is essentially a search for the truth. The atmosphere
of a courtroom, therefore, should be more akin to that of a laboratory
than to that of an arena or a stage. This is true even though many
lawsuits involve human drama and tragedy equal to and possibly
surpassing the finest of Shakespearean tragedy. Because trials are in
s162 Ohio St. 370, 123 N.E.2d 8 (1954), cert. denied, 349 US. 929 (1955).
2123 N.E.2d at io-ii. (Emphasis added).
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a sense contests under our adversary procedure, they develop tensions, but judicial procedure is not emotional. It is rational and logical, and one of the duties of a judge is to keep it that way in order
that these tensions may be lessened.
In the quest for the truth, the material used is evidence. Aside
from demonstrative evidence, such as pictures, charts, pieces of personal property, etc., the main source of information is the oral testimony of witnesses.
It is all important, of course, that the witness be permitted and
encouraged to use all of his powers of memory and recollection, and
that he be uninhibited in his narration of the events of which he
testifies.
In addition to the duty of the judge to provide all of the incentive
possible for a witness to tell the whole truth, a right of the witness is
also involved.
We have noted earlier that when two freedoms clash, one must
give way. One of the basic freedoms in a democratic society is the
right of privacy, and the question arises immediately to what extent
is this right of privacy lost by becoming either a witness to or a participant in a public event?
Consider either an automobile accident or a murder occurring on
a public street. The drivers of the cars and the killer unquestionably
have become involved in a public event. They have become news,
and no doubt have sacrificed some, if not all, of their right of privacy
with respect to fair comment and publicity concerning their participation in the event. To what extent they have lost the right not to be
photographed during the progress of a trial, is a debatable issue and is
the subject of a conflict in the cases. The majority rule is probably to
the effect that it is not an invasion of the right of privacy to publish
the person's photograph or otherwise give publicity to his connection
with the event.
But what about the innocent bystander who merely happened to
be present and who witnessed the event? Has he thereby involuntarily
and unwittingly sacrificed any of his right of privacy? Yes-to a degree.
He can be summoned to court against his will and be required to
testify as to what he saw and heard. His duty is to tell the jury what
he saw and heard, and he can be compelled to do so under pain of
contempt of court if he refuses.
Many such witnesses are by nature timid and nervous. They are
not accustomed to talking in public, and in many instances it is a real
chore for them. Trial lawyers well know the difficulty in securing the

14
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voluntary attendance of witnesses. Some create excuses and others even
deny knowledge of the event. In most instances this is not because they
do not know or do not want to testify, but simply because of their fear
of the witness stand. They have heard of cross-examination and many
have seen the distorted portrayal of it on the television screen, and
they are doubtful of their ability to accurately relate their story.
But, whatever their reluctance, they are summoned to court to
testify, not to have their pictures taken and broadcast upon hundreds
of television screens. Timid and nervous as they may be about talking
in public, the human nature of the average person is that he be not
photographed for public display. Such an ordeal, without question,
would not only hamper such a witness in his recollection and ability
to accurately give his testimony, but his demeanor on the witness stand
would reflect adversely upon the weight of his testimony in the minds
of the jury to the disadvantage of the party for whom his testimony
is given.
It is no answer to such a person that the camera itself is hidden in
a booth outside the walls of the courtroom. The fact that he knows he
is being televised would be sufficient to unnerve him. Nor is it an
answer, as provided in the Colorado Canon, that no such witness
shall be photographed over his express objection. This requires him to
take the affirimative and register a protest in advance in order to protect himself from such an ordeal. He may very well feel that to register such a protest labels him as a weakling of some sort, and pride
may prevent him from doing so.
At the other extreme is the danger inherent in the testimony of
the witness who is not only willing but anxious to be televised as he
gives his testimony. He is a willing actor, and his concern will be with
his effectiveness as an actor rather than compliance with his oath to
tell the truth and nothing but the truth.
Furthermore, there is the juror to consider. He is summoned
and required to serve, unless excused, irrespective of his desires or the
inconvenience it may cause him. But here again, he is summoned to
listen, ponder and render judgment-not to participate in a glamour
contest. In his work as a juror he should be afforded an environment
in which he can concentrate on his task as a juror, and not be concerned as to whether his frown is doing an injustice to his naturally
photogenic features, or whether his crooked tie and ruffled hair are the
butt of jokes around the TV screen at Joe's Beer Tavern or the
Country Club.
The natural result of permitting courtroom scenes to be televised
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would be to convert the courtroom into a stage for those who can act,
and into a place of additional burden for those who are reluctant
to testify in the first place.
Freedom of the press, as a result for telecasting courtroom proceedings, must give way in order that the foregoing equally important
rights may be fostered and that a fair trial will result.
As a matter of fact, is it really freedom of the press that telecasters
want? They do not want to come into the courtroom as newspaper
reporters do, take notes, and go to their studios and compose their
own programs for telecast. They want, not freedom of the press, but
freedom of camera lens and microphones. They want to carry on
their business in and from the courtroom.
And what is this business? A recent analysis of the time coverage
of the programs telecast by the three leading television systems for a
week reveals the following:

Type of Entertainment
Per Gent
Big name entertainment ................................................
17
W esterns ........................................................
9
Crim e and detective .........................................................
6
O ther fiction plays ...........................................................
16
M orbid and sob-stuff .........................................................
5
Sports ..........................................................
9
Music (folk, dance, classical) ...........................................
5
C hildrens ...........................................................................
9
Guessing panels ................................................................
4
News and commentary ..................................................
12
Educational ........................................................................
3
Religious (services and music)..........................................
5
1O6O

The above classification of programs is either what the television
industry wants the public to see, or it is what the public wants to see.
When the argument is made by proponents of their desire to telecast
courtroom proceedings for educational purposes, someone is either
lying or badly informed. Eighty per cent of the programs now telecast
are for entertainment, pure and simple, and this identifies the television media as one of entertainment.
III. CONCLUSION

Giving the widest latitude to arguments on behalf of the television
industry that what transpires in a courtroom is news, and that it
should be televised under the right of freedom of the press; that the
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public has a right to see on a TV screen the halting step of a crippled
person as he hobbles to the witness stand and to hear the timid voice
of the nervous person terrified by the thought that his every movement
and word is being broadcast; the overwhelming conclusion is that a
Canon prohibiting such telecasting is proper.
But some of the reasons assigned in Canon 35 at it now reads are
from the horse and buggy days. Modem day televising techniques
do not detract from the essential dignity of the courtroom proceedings. The physical activity associated with such telecasting in no way
interferes with the orderly transaction of the court's work. It is
difficult to comprehend how the watching of a telecast of what actually goes on in the courtroom could create any misconception with respect thereto in the minds of the public.
In fact, the only valid reason stated in the Canon is that telecasting
would "distract the witness in giving his testimony," but the Canon
does not state this in the strong terms in which it should be stated. The
Canon should be redrafted in somewhat the following language:
The taking of photographs in the courtroom during sessions of the court, and knowledge by witnesses and jurors that
the proceedings are being broadcast or telecast, tends to prevent the witness from being accurate in his testimony and the
juror from concentrating on his task, and therefore such photographing, broadcasting and telecasting should not be permitted.

